
The Generation Divide: How Young and Old View Brexit

John Curtice

NatCen Social Research/Strathclyde University


The Generation Divide





Grown Wider?

% voted/would vote Leave



Source: Survation/Channel 4 20.10-2.11.18

Possible Explanations?

- Identity more European
- Values more socially liberal
- (Perceived) Interest benefit more from globalisation


 Implications for whether the divide is likely to be an age or a cohort effect?

Sources


- British Social Attitudes 2017
 - Random probability sample of 3,998 people interviewed face to face and via self-completion questionnaire
 - Three-quarters (2,986) asked about voting in EU referendum, of whom 75% said they did.
 - All asked categorical national identity, immigration preference, and (via self-completion) liberal-conservative scale questions and long-term evaluations of Brexit
 - One-quarter (1,036) asked strength of EU identity and immediate evaluations of Brexit
- British Social Attitudes 2016
 - All 2,942 asked voting in EU referendum, categorical national identity and (self-completion) liberal-conservative qns.

Product of Different Educational Background and Experience?







Pick Out 'European'



Reported Strength of European Identity



Liberal-Conservative Values



How Much Do These Explain - 1?

Age Group	Alone	+ European Mentioned	+ Liberal or Conservative
18-24	-1.47 **	-1.17 **	-1.00 **
25-34	-1.05 **	-0.91 **	-0.94 **
35-44	-1.05 **	-0.88 **	-1.01 **
45-54	-0.66 **	-0.54 **	-0.52 **
55-64	-0.33 *	-0.25	-0.10
(65+)			
R2	7%	19%	32%


How Much Do These Explain - 2?

Age Group	Alone	+ European Mentioned	+ Liberal or Conservative
18-24	-1.74 **	-1.65 **	-1.03 **
25-34	-1.06 **	-0.85 **	-0.67 **
35-44	-0.76 **	-0.71 **	-0.88 **
45-54	-0.31 *	-0.23	-0.23
55-64	-0.22	-0.12	-0.10
(65+)			
R2	7%	17%	31%
N	2206	2206	1874

Better Measures (?), Fewer Cases

Age Group	Alone	+ Strength European Identity	+ Liberal/Con- servative Scale
18-24	-1.97 **	-2.00 **	-1.35 **
25-34	-1.20 **	-0.79 **	-0.77 *
35-44	-0.97**	-0.91 **	-0.71 *
45-54	-0.49 *	-0.37	-0.44
55-64	-0.36	-0.28	-0.16
(65+)			
R2	9%	31%	39%
N	789	784	631

Perspectives on Immigration




Adding Immigration To Models

Age Group	+ Culture To Better Measures	+ Policy Preference To More Cases
18-24	-1.40 **	-0.86 **
25-34	-0.55	-0.67 **
35-44	-0.32	-0.55 **
45-54	-0.18	-0.19
55-64	-0.44	-0.13
(65+)		
R2	48%	38%
N	625	1792

Economic Evaluations of Brexit

% worse off as result of Brexit



Adding To Economic Evaluations to Models

	Better Measures	More Cases
18-24	-1.26 *	-0.85 *
25-34	-0.57	-0.32
35-44	+0.13	-0.36
45-54	+0.09	-0.02
55-64	-0.11	+0.22
(65+)		
R2	67%	59%
N	612	1655

Not Just A Question of Economics

	No Time Frame	In 10 years
18-24	-1.86 **	-1.54 **
25-34	-0.69 *	-0.49 *
35-44	-0.49	-0.41
45-54	+0.02	-0.02
55-64	-0.03	+0.20
(65+)		
R2	59%	54%
N	766	1681

Conclusion

- European identity does not provide a sufficient explanation of the age divide
- Nor do values though we do better if we are willing to regard attitudes to immigration as a value measure
- Economic evaluations do a 'better' job of explaining the age divide – but questions of reciprocal causation
- Even so, support of 18-24 year olds for EU membership still stands out
- Perhaps their support for EU membership is simply less well structured?
- Meantime, maybe we should not assume that younger generation will (necessarily) stay as (relatively) pro-EU as it is at present?