

**Inequalities, Employability, Social Vulnerability, Skills  
Mismatch, Life Chances and the Intergenerational  
Transmission of Poverty in the Greek Youth**

<http://neets2.soc.uoc.gr>

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
# PART I

**A country heavily affected by the Crisis  
Preliminary remarks**

## 1. Preliminary remarks

- 9 years after the outbreak of the Crisis in Europe and 8 since the first “Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies”, was agreed (on 2 May 2010) by the Greek Government on the one hand and the EC, the ECB and the IMF on the other, followed by strict conditions and extended austerity measures (see Featherstone 2013: 202), **the wake of the Recession is still evident in the Greek Economy and Society. In fact, despite the rescue efforts, the austerity measures, the domestic reforms and the recent gradual improvement of the Economy, the crisis is ongoing and its social impact is undoubtedly tremendous.**
- Greece is the country most heavily affected by the economic crisis, more than any other European one. According to Matsagganis, by the end of 2013 the size of the economy was already “*contracted by 23.5 per cent in real terms relative to 2007. This is far greater than the equivalent contraction in other southern European economies – Spain: –5.5 per cent; Portugal: –7.4 per cent; Italy: –7.8 per cent or Ireland –5.0 per cent – over the same period. So deep and drawn out a recession has simply no precedent in the peacetime economic history of most advanced economies*” (Matsaganis 2013: 3).
- Furthermore, across the OECD countries, Greece is the country with the highest vertical decrease in real wages, i.e. since the 1<sup>st</sup> quarter of 2009 the decline is about 5% per year. The crisis has affected both private and public sector in Greece. In the private sector wage cuts were -3.4% per year and in the public sector wage cuts reached -1.9% per year (OECD 2014a: 1).
- **It should be noted that during the years of the Crisis till today, Greece has lost more than 25% of its GDP.**
- The impact of the ongoing crisis in employment was huge and persistent. Unemployment has risen from 7.8% in 2008 (see Eurostat 2015a ) to 26.1% in 2014, namely 1.245.854 people were unemployed at the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter of 2014 (see Hellenic Statistical Authority 2015a: 1-2). Since the onset of the crisis, the Greek unemployment remains extremely high, despite its slight decrease since 2014. While the total unemployment in the EU28 dropped in 8,3% in October 2016 (namely 0,8 percentage points lower than the one in October 2015 and the lowest rate recorded since 2009 in the EU28- see Eurostat 2016g) and further dropped to 7,6% in August 2017, the total unemployment in Greece was 20,9% (November 2017), namely almost the triple comparing to the EU one and much higher than the unemployment rate in the 2<sup>nd</sup> low achiever in the EU, namely Spain, where the unemployment rate the same period (November 2017) was up to 16,6% (Eurostat 2016h: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=teilm020&plugin=1>, ELSTAT 1 March 2018, Eurostat Press Release 10 April 2018).
- **In June 2017, 1.017.000 people were unemployed in Greece.**

**Diagram 1: Unemployment rates in the European Union (EU28 & EU19)**



Source: Eurostat 10/4/2018.

In 2011, Matsaganis claimed that *“the rise in unemployment is likely to be transformed into higher poverty, while in the past the correlation between the two has been rather weak”* (Matsaganis, 2011: 510). Indeed, that’s the case: in 2016 21,4% of the Greek population lives under the poverty limit, while 35,7% was at risk of poverty and social exclusion, according to the Hellenic Statistic Authority (see HSA 2016). Moreover, due to the lack of an effective Welfare State in Greece (which would provide a safety net and a decent level of living conditions for those who are at risk-of-poverty) as well as the increase of both total unemployment and long-term unemployment, there is a significant rise in the number of Greek jobless households (see Matsaganis 2013 and Papadakis et al. 2016a). Specifically, when the economic crisis hit Greece (2009), the proportion of the population living in jobless households was: 4.9% for 0-17 years and 8.4% for 18-60 years. However in 2013, the jobless population increased in 13.3% for 0-17 years and 19.6% for 18-60 years respectively (Hellenic Statistical Authority 2015b: 38-39), while in 2015 1.111.300 Greeks live in jobless households (see analytically Hellenic Statistical Authority 2016).

All the key domains and the age- groups of the Greek society are affected by the ongoing Recession, since among others *“the fiscal crisis is depriving the welfare state of precious resources”* (Matsaganis 2011). Probably the most affected age- group is the youth.


# PART II

## **Youth Unemployment in the EU and Greece** **On the state of play**

## 2.1. Youth unemployment in the European Union: Preliminary Remarks

Historically the rate of youth unemployment is higher, double or more than double, than the totally unemployment rate. The onset of the economic downturn resulted in a dramatic increase in the rates of youth unemployment, culminating in the years 2009-2013, as shown in the diagram below, reflecting the difficulties and obstacles that young people face in finding jobs and getting integrated in the labour market. **Diagram 1 clearly shows the change in youth unemployment rates in the European Union from 2000 to 2015, and, in particular, the sharp increase in the rate from the onset of the financial crisis (2008) until 2013** (Eurostat, 2015a: [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment\\_statistics](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics)).

**Diagram 1: Youth unemployment rates, EU-28 and EA-18, seasonally adjusted, January 2000 - March 2015 (%)**



Source: Eurostat (une\_rt\_m) as cited in Eurostat, 2015a: [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment\\_statistics](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics).




## 2.2. Youth Unemployment in EU and Greece A

- Unemployment, youth unemployment, poverty and their persisting correlation constitute probably the major challenges in the EU, at the moment. **According to the Euro- barometer, more than 8 out of 10 Europeans consider unemployment, social inequalities and migration the top challenges, that the EU is facing, while more than the half of the Europeans consider that not everyone has chances to succeed and life changes would be more limited for the young- next generation** (see Eurobarometer 2017, as cited in European Commission 2017b: 20).
- According to the European Commission *“child poverty also remains high and is rising in several Member States. This means that these children have limited access to health care, a higher risk of school drop-out and later, as adults, higher risks of unemployment and poverty. In 2010, EU leaders had committed to reduce the number of people at risk of poverty by 20 million by 2020, yet today, Europe is far off track to deliver on this objective. So far, there has been an increase of 1.7 million people at risk of poverty”* (European Commission 2017b: 11).
- As far as Greece is concerned, while in the EU *“almost a quarter of the EU27 population is estimated to be at risk of poverty or social exclusion”*, in Greece the equivalent rate is up to 34,8% (see European Commission 2017b: 11).
- Even though youth unemployment is falling, since 2014, it still remains high, while the total unemployment rates differ substantially across Europe, which eventually affects youth unemployment.
- Education has (despite its existing dissociation from the labour market) a key role to play in life chances, since at the European level there is currently a strong association between educational attainment and social outcomes: *“people with only basic education are almost three times more likely to live in poverty or social exclusion than those with tertiary education. In 2016, only 44.0 % of young people (18-24) who had finished school below the upper secondary level were employed. And in the general population (15-64), unemployment is much more prevalent among those with only basic education (16.6 %) than for the tertiary educated (5.1 %)”* (European Commission 2017a: 9).

- In March 2018, the youth unemployment rate in the EU28 was 15,1% (Men: 15,5%, Women: 15,1%- see Eurostat, 2018b), namely scaled back by 4,9% since September 2015 (20%) (see Eurostat 2016a), while it further dropped to 14,9% in August 2018 (see Eurostat 2018h: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=teilm021&plugin=1>).
- . The decrease of youth unemployment, especially comparing to its historical high in April 2013 (23.8%- see Eurostat 2014a), even relieving, cannot hold back the increasing asymmetries among the M-S.
- In Greece the situation is far worse, despite its gradual improvement during the period 2014- 2018. Specifically, youth unemployment in Greece dropped to 43,2% in March 2018 (Men: 39,6% & Women: 43,2%- see Eurostat 2018a) relative to 51,6% in April 2015 (see Eurostat 2016a and Eurostat 2016b). It further dropped to 36,8% in August 2018 (see Eurostat 2018h: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=teilm021&plugin=1>). However, Greek youth unemployment still remains jointly with Spain at the top of the ranking among M-S. Indeed, an ominous “privilege”. There is no doubt that Greece is one of the EU countries where the impact of the economic crisis was rapid and visible from the very first months it hit the country. Its “visibility” is tremendous when it comes to youth unemployment. The worth-mentioning decrease on the youth unemployment, relative to its historic high on February 2013 (60,5%- see Eurostat 2015c), shouldn’t reverse the fact that:
  - **a) Greece has an more than double-as-high youth unemployment percentage compared to the EU one (15,1%), b) youth unemployment is still almost double relative to the one before the onset of the crisis (in Greece, the youth unemployment was 21,9% in 2008 (Eurostat 2016f), c) even nowadays (over 8 years since the onset of the crisis), almost ore than 1 out of 3 young people in Greece are unemployed and d) Skills mismatches in Greece are the highest in the EU: “at 43.3 % in 2016, the share of tertiary graduates working in jobs that do not require a higher education qualification was higher than elsewhere in the EU (EU average: 26 %)” (Cedefop, 2018 as cited in European Commission, 2018c: 129).**

Map 1: Unemployment rates across Europe (in %, February 2017).






- Furthermore, the employment rate of recent Upper Secondary and Higher Education Graduates is stagnated and remains extremely low. It slightly improved, from 40 % in 2013 to 49,2 % in 2016 and 52% in 2017, yet is still very far away from the EU-28 average, namely 75,4 % in 2013, 78,2 % in 2016 and 80,2% in 2017 (see European Commission 2017c: 3, European Commission 2018a: 26 and European Commission 2018b: 1).
- Additionally, Greece has an alarmingly low employment rate for recent VET upper-secondary graduates. In 2015 it was just 37.5 %, namely half the EU average of 73.0 % (see European Commission 2016b: 1 & 7). The extremely low rates of recent graduates' employability limit the social dynamic of education and reduce its role to social mobility.
- Another critical issue that substantially affects young people's life chances and life courses is the **over-representation of long-term unemployment among youth**. The long-term youth unemployment rate in the EU *“increased considerably, from 23% in 2008 to around 30% in 2016, meaning that almost one-third of unemployed young people have been looking for a job for 12 months or more without success. As the data show, of these, the majority have been out of work for more than two years, illustrating the risk of job-seekers becoming trapped in protracted spells of unemployment. The extent of long-term youth unemployment varies considerably across Member States, with the highest rates recorded in Greece (53%), Italy (52%) and Slovakia (47%), while the lowest rates are found in all countries with very well-developed policy interventions, including well-functioning Youth Guarantee schemes, such as Denmark (8%), Finland (7%) and Sweden (5%) (Eurofound 2017: 3).*
- It should be mentioned at this point that there is ***a strong association between educational attainment and social outcomes including the risk of poverty and/ or social exclusion*** (see European Commission 2017: 9).

### Employment rate of recent graduates



Source: Eurostat (EU-LFS, 2016)

Visual 1 – Rates of 'at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion' of people aged 18 and over by level educational attainment level, EU-28, 2015



Legend: (i) top, persons with ISCED 0-2 (max. lower secondary education); (ii) middle, persons with ISCED 3-4 (upper-secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education); (iii) bottom, persons with ISCED 5-8 (tertiary education).

Source: European Commission, 2017: 4 & 10.

## Greece

### Education, Training, Employability; A brief overview of the state of play (2018)

|  |   |           | Greece              |                     | EU average           |                     |
|--|---|-----------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
|  |   |           | 2014                | 2017                | 2014                 | 2017                |
| <b>Education and training 2020 benchmarks</b>  |   |           |                     |                     |                      |                     |
| Early leavers from education and training (age 18-24)  |   |           | 9.0%                | 6.0%                | 11.2%                | 10.6%               |
| Tertiary educational attainment (age 30-34)  |   |           | 37.2%               | 43.7%               | 37.9%                | 39.9%               |
| Early childhood education and care<br>(from age 4 to starting age of compulsory primary education)                                 |   |           | 76.3% <sup>13</sup> | 79.8% <sup>16</sup> | 94.2% <sup>13</sup>  | 95.3% <sup>16</sup> |
| Proportion of 15 year-olds underachieving in:  | Reading   |           | 22.6% <sup>12</sup> | 27.3% <sup>15</sup> | 17.8% <sup>12</sup>  | 19.7% <sup>15</sup> |
|  | Maths   |           | 35.7% <sup>12</sup> | 35.8% <sup>15</sup> | 22.1% <sup>12</sup>  | 22.2% <sup>15</sup> |
|  | Science   |           | 25.5% <sup>12</sup> | 32.7% <sup>15</sup> | 16.6% <sup>12</sup>  | 20.6% <sup>15</sup> |
| Employment rate of recent graduates by educational attainment<br>(age 20-34 having left education 1-3 years before reference year) | ISCED 3-8 (total)   |           | 44.3%               | 52.0%               | 76.0%                | 80.2%               |
| Adult participation in learning<br>(age 25-64)   | ISCED 0-8 (total)   |           | 3.2%                | 4.5%                | 10.8%                | 10.9%               |
| Learning mobility  | Degree mobile graduates (ISCED 5-8)                                 |           | :                   | 11.1% <sup>16</sup> | :                    | 3.1% <sup>16</sup>  |
|  | Credit mobile graduates (ISCED 5-8)                                 |           | :                   | 2.2% <sup>16</sup>  | :                    | 7.6% <sup>16</sup>  |
| <b>Other contextual indicators</b>   |   |           |                     |                     |                      |                     |
| Education investment   | Public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP              |           | 4.3%                | 4.3% <sup>16</sup>  | 4.9%                 | 4.7% <sup>16</sup>  |
|  | Expenditure on public and private institutions per student in € PPS | ISCED 1-2 | :                   | : <sup>15</sup>     | €6 494 <sup>d</sup>  | : <sup>15</sup>     |
|  |   | ISCED 3-4 | :                   | : <sup>15</sup>     | €7 741 <sup>d</sup>  | : <sup>15</sup>     |
|  |   | ISCED 5-8 | :                   | : <sup>15</sup>     | €11 187 <sup>d</sup> | : <sup>15</sup>     |
| Early leavers from education and training (age 18-24)  | Native-born   |           | 7.3%                | 5.4%                | 10.4%                | 9.6%                |
|  | Foreign-born  |           | 27.8%               | 16.9%               | 20.2%                | 19.4%               |
| Tertiary educational attainment (age 30-34)  | Native-born   |           | 41.3%               | 47.1%               | 38.6%                | 40.6%               |
|  | Foreign-born  |           | 8.4%                | 11.9%               | 34.3%                | 36.3%               |
| Employment rate of recent graduates by educational attainment<br>(age 20-34 having left education 1-3 years before reference year) | ISCED 3-4   |           | 38.8%               | 44.8%               | 70.7%                | 74.1%               |
|  | ISCED 5-8   |           | 47.4%               | 55.8%               | 80.5%                | 84.9%               |

Source: European Commission, 2018a: 125.

# PART III

## **The case of Neets**

## 3. The case of NEETs

### 3.1 Definitional Issues

- **At the operational level, the NEET indicator corresponds to the percentage of the population of a given age group and sex that is not employed and not involved in education or training.**
- **“The main NEET indicator produced by Eurostat covers the 15–24 years age group.** For analytical purposes, the indicator is then disaggregated by sex and made available for different age groups (1–19 years, 15–17 years, 15–24 years, 15–29 years, 15–34 years, 18–24 years, 20–24 years, 20–34 years and 25–29 years). Breakdowns by labour market status (unemployed or inactive) and education level (at most lower secondary attainment or at least upper secondary attainment) are also available on the Eurostat website” (European Commission, 2011 as cited in Eurofound, 2012: 22).

#### The term NEET

- 📖 **in most European countries refers to young people aged 15-24 (European Commission, 2013c: 2),**
- 📖 **in Japan, to young people aged 15-34 (OECD, 2008 as cited in Eurofound, 2012: 20),**
- 📖 **in OECD’s data, to young people aged 15-29 (OECD, 2013: 326)**
- 📖 **while in some national cases (e.g in the UK), it captures teenagers in the age of 16- 18 (Social Exclusion Unit, 1999: 2).**

**“While the youth unemployment rate refers just to the economically active members of the population who were not able to find a job, the NEET rate can be understood as the share of the total population of young people who are currently not engaged in employment, education or training” (Eurofound, 2012: 23).**

#### Youth unemployment rate

$$\frac{\text{Number of young unemployed}}{\text{Number of young people economically active}}$$

#### NEET rate

$$\frac{\text{Number of young NEET}}{\text{Total population of young people}}$$


## 3.2. The state of play regarding NEETs in Europe

The rate of young people not in education, employment or training (NEET) (15-24) *in E.E.-28 increased in 13% in 2013 compared to 11% in 2008* (European Commission, 2015: 17) . *In 2017 the total NEET rate in the EU was 10,9% (Men: 10,6%, Women: 11,1%) and it differs significantly among Member-States* (Eurostat, 2018g).

*In Greece, Italy and Bulgaria the rates still exceed 15%, while in 2013 have exceeded 20%. In most of the EU countries, the rise in NEETs rates was a consequence of the increase in youth unemployment rates rather than inactivity. Specifically, in Greece, Spain and Croatia around 70% of NEETs are unemployed but active, while in Bulgaria, Romania and Italy the majority of NEETs' population were inactive* (European Commission, 2015: 48).

However, the majority of inactive NEETs, are 'discouraged workers'. Namely, they believe that there is no available job for them (Eurofound, 2012: 33). This fact implies that there are structural barriers in relation to young population's transition and inclusion in the labour market or in education (see Eurofound, 2016: 20 and Diagram 2).

**Diagram 2: NEET rate for the EU, EA and Member States in 2013 and the highest and lowest rates since 2008**




**Source:** Eurostat, EU-LFS data [edat\_lfse\_20] as cited in European Commission, 2015: 17.



## Neets in Greece

- There is, at the moment, a slight decrease of the NEET rate in almost all the abovementioned countries, yet the NEETs percentage remains alarmingly high.
- As far as Greece is concerned:
  - As observed in 2010 the rate increased in 14,8% (European rate of NEETs: 12,8%), in 2011 to 17,4% (European rate : 12,9%), in 2012 reached 20,2% (European rate: 13,2%), culminating in 2013 to 20,4% (European rate: 13%), 9 percentage points above the rate of 2008, while in 2017 the NEET rate “returned”, for the first time, to the before-Crisis percentages (Eurostat, 2016d, Eurostat, 2016c and Eurostat, 2018g ). More specifically, in 2015 the total rate of NEETs in Greece was 17,2%, 1,9 percentage points below the NEETs rate in 2014 (19,1%). In 2016 it slightly dropped to 15,8% and kept slightly dropping in 2017, when the NEET rate was 15,3% (Eurostat, 2018f and Eurostat, 2018g).
  - Although the Greek rate was almost the same with the European rate in 2008 and 2009, now it is by 40,3% (4,4 percentage points) higher than the European one.

**Diagram 3: NEETs rates in Greece & E.E.-28 (2008-2015)**



**Source:** Eurostat, 2016d: <http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/setupDownloads.do>.

# PART IV

**Youth and Neets in Greece today.**

# 4.1. Youth and Neets in Greece today. The current state of play

Findings of the Neets2 EEA – funded project (EEA Grants/ GR07-3757)


(stratified quota-based sampling/ 2.769 respondents in the total of the 13 Administrative Regions)

## 4.1.1. Key Results

**Neets (16,4% of the youth) compared to our control group (namely young people 15-24):**

- ↑ age
- ↓ age-adjusted years of education
- More likely to live with parents
- ↑ prior work experience
- ↓ family income


Young people in Greece; distribution of the age group 15-24.




## Age distribution of Neets

Age seems to be a determining factor that affects a person's chances to qualify as Neet. Following a descriptive analysis we can see that after the age of 22 the Neet phenomenon becomes exponential and culminates at the age of 24 years, where 34.9% of people of this age are now Neet. This allows us to conclude with certainty that the Greek family and Greek society have managed to find the mechanisms that prevent the marginalization of younger people, mechanisms which, however, do not cover as efficiently older ages.


Age remains (given the findings of the Absents' Barometer) definitely a main determinant, and perhaps the most important, affecting the chances of someone to be classed as NEET




## 4.1.2. THE EDUCATION LEVEL OF THE GREEK YOUTH (22,1% HE graduates)



### • NEETS



### no NEETS



- ❖ Almost 1 out of 4 young people (15- 24) is high skilled.
- ❖ 27,4% of the Greek Neets are Higher Education graduates, clearly more than their peers (21,2%).
- ❖ More than 1 out of 4 Neets is high skilled in Greece.
- ❖ 27,4% of the Greek NEETs are Higher Education graduates (clearly more than their peers- 21,2%), namely more than 1 out of 4 NEETs is high skilled in Greece (see Papadakis et al 2017: 19 -20), Indeed, this is an alarming finding, especially given the fact that in the majority of EU countries, NEETs are usually low or medium skilled (see Eurofound 2012: 31 and Eurofound 2016: 2). The HE graduates are over-represented among the youth, highlighting the gradual disengagement of the Higher Education form the Labour Market, during the Crisis.



### 4.1.3. FAMILY INCOME


The main finding here is that the majority of both the youth as such and the Neets live in households with low or very low income is of particular interest.

Further analysis documents that Neets are members of families with a lower income than their peers.

We can therefore say that the family income is another determining factor that increases a young person's chances to fall in the Neet category. **It is obvious that the inclusion in the category Neet is directly correlated (more precisely: determined by) with the family income.** Most simply, the lower the monthly family income is, the greater the risk of social exclusion becomes.

***The above-mentioned findings reinforces and largely confirms the hypothesis of intergenerational transmission of poverty in today's Greece (see Papatheodorou & Papanastasiou, 2010 and Papadakis, Kyridis & Papargyris 2015).***

- **Young People (total)**



- **NEETS**






## 4.1.5. Youth employability, civic values and political behavior


### I. Self- defining the individual condition

30,8% of the young people in Greece and 45.8% of Neets describes their situation as hard and unbearable. Thus, 1 out of 3 young people in Greece and half the Neets face severe difficulties on their daily life. The significant variation of 17.9 percentage points between Neets and their peers demonstrates the strong psychological impact caused by the marginalization of young people and their elimination from the labour market and the educational process.




## II. Prior work experience


### NEETS



### Young people, in total



### no NEETS



### more than 3 years



### till 3 years



### till 2 years



### till 1 year



### till 6 months




### DK/DA




0 20 40 60 80

**For how long you are unemployed?**  
(concerns the 56% of the young people who have prior working experience)


### more than 3 years




### till 3 years



### till 2 years




### till 1 year



### till 6 months



### NA



0 20 40 60 80

**For how long you are unemployed?**  
(concerns the 73,6% of the Neets who have prior working experience)

The majority of young people and the vast majority of the Neets (unlike their non Neets peers) has prior working experience.

Neets, coming from families with lower income, were more forced to enter earlier the labour market, yet all of the 73,66% of them who have worked in the past are now un-employed.

It is a crystal clear effect of the persisting crisis. The following tables makes it self-evident. The vast majority of the Neets (84,3%) as well as of their peers (76,5%) have lost their jobs during the last 2 years.

44% of the young people (26,4% of Neets and 47,8% of their peers) have not ever entered the labor market. 26,1% (26,3% of Neets) of the ones who did it, are now long-term unemployed. Delaying entry or being dis-engaged from the labour market decisively hampers the possibility of integration into employment in general.

**Further, the relationship between unemployment and the educational level was found to be statistically significant,  $\chi^2(3, 2685) = 47.84, p < 0.001$ .** More specifically, it is observed that the highest percentage of unemployed people, in the order of 64%, can be classified at the ISCED levels 3-4 (i.e. upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education graduates). On the other hand, 22.4% of the employed can be classified at the ISCED levels 1-2, while slightly over half (11.7%) of the unemployed have attained the same level of education.

Further, a statistically significant correlation between the unemployment status and the average monthly family income was found,  $\chi^2(4, 2205) = 12.47, p = 0.014$ . In particular, it is noted that for the highest percentage of unemployed, in the order of 35.3%, the average monthly family income earned fell in the €501 - €1000 category (low income). However, the percentage of those who were employed and were in the same “monthly family income” category was lower, roughly at 29.7%. Moreover, it is observed that the average monthly family income in the €1501 - €2000 category (the higher one) was higher for employed people than for unemployed (17.5% and 13.1%, respectively). *It becomes more than obvious that the family economic- status affects substantially the employment and subsequently the life- chances.*

**Table 2: Correlation between unemployment and average monthly family income**

|                               | Current Unemployment |      |            |      |            |      |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|------|------------|------|------------|------|
|                               | Yes                  |      | No         |      | Total      |      |
|                               | (n = 814)            |      | (n = 1391) |      | (N = 2205) |      |
|                               | f                    | %    | f          | %    | f          | %    |
| Average family monthly income |                      |      |            |      |            |      |
| Up to 500 €                   | 137                  | 16.8 | 225        | 16.2 | 362        | 16.4 |
| 501-1000 €                    | 287                  | 35.3 | 413        | 29.7 | 700        | 31.7 |
| 1001-1500 €                   | 197                  | 24.2 | 370        | 26.6 | 567        | 25.7 |
| 1501-2000 €                   | 107                  | 13.1 | 243        | 17.5 | 350        | 15.9 |
| Over 2000 €                   | 86                   | 10.6 | 140        | 10.1 | 226        | 10.2 |


**Table 1: Correlation between current unemployment and educational level**

| Educational level | Current Unemployment |      |            |      |            |      |
|-------------------|----------------------|------|------------|------|------------|------|
|                   | Yes                  |      | No         |      | Total      |      |
|                   | (n = 972)            |      | (n = 1713) |      | (N = 2685) |      |
|                   | f                    | %    | f          | %    | f          | %    |
| ISCED 1-2         | 114                  | 11.7 | 383        | 22.4 | 497        | 18.5 |
| ISCED 3-4         | 622                  | 64.0 | 961        | 56.1 | 1583       | 59.0 |
| ISCED 5-6         | 231                  | 23.8 | 355        | 20.7 | 586        | 21.8 |
| ISCED 7           | 5                    | 0.5  | 14         | 0.8  | 19         | 0.7  |




### III. On training and employability

Young people, in total




**Chart 7:** Evaluation of training's effectiveness by the participants (whether it helped them finding a job – with regard to the ones who have attended a training program).

NEETS



no NEETS



**Just 15,9% of the young people (17,7% of Neets and 15,6% of their peers) have attended a training programme in the past.**

❖ **The minority of young people has attended a training program and among them, the vast majority considers training ineffective.**

❖ **It is obvious that despite unemployment, young people neither are attracted from training nor trust it at all.**

❖ **84,1% of the young population has never attended a training program, and in many regions this percentage exceeds 90%.**

**The training programs were more attended by women, members of the 20-24 years old age group and the residents of urban areas.**

❖ **Those who have previously been trained, confirm that training didn't operate as an active employment policy, although this is its fundamental function.**

**It is worth-mentioning, that according to the findings, there is a statistically significant relationship between the educational level and the professional training received**,  $\chi^2 (3, 2646) = 55.04, p < 0.001$ . In particular, it is noted that 28.7% of TEI (Higher Technological Education Institutes) or University graduates (ISCED 5-6) had received professional training in the past, whilst the percentage of TEI or university graduates who had not received prior professional training is lower, in the order of 20%. At the same time, 21.6% of those who had not received prior vocational training can be classified at the ISCED levels 1-2, whereas only 8.1% of the subjects who had received vocational training can be placed at the same level of educational attainment.


**Table 4: Correlation between educational level and professional training received**

| Educational level | Received Professional Training<br>in the past |      |                          |      |                             |      |
|-------------------|---|------|--------------------------|------|-----------------------------|------|
|                   | No<br>( <i>n</i> = 2224)                      |      | Yes<br>( <i>n</i> = 422) |      | Total<br>( <i>N</i> = 2646) |      |
|                   | <i>f</i>                                      | %    | <i>f</i>                 | %    | <i>f</i>                    | %    |
| ISCED 1-2         | 481   | 21.6 | 34                       | 8.1  | 515                         | 19.5 |
| ISCED 3-4         | 1289  | 58.0 | 260                      | 61.6 | 1549                        | 58.5 |
| ISCED 5-6         | 444   | 20.0 | 121                      | 28.7 | 565                         | 21.4 |
| ISCED 7           | 10  | 0.4  | 7                        | 1.7  | 17                          | 0.6  |




## IV. Young people's priorities in the Era of Crisis

### • **NEETS**




### **not NEETS**



Here we can easily notice a totally reverse image, in terms of life-course design, between the Neets and their peers. While job- seeking is a clear priority for Neets, learning process far exceeds in their peers' priorities.


## V. EMOTIONS CAUSED BY THE ONGOING ECONOMIC CRISIS A N INSECURE AND ANGRY YOUTH

The emotions caused to young people in Greece due to the economic crisis are basically insecurity (48%), anger (27%) and anxiety (17,1%). Almost none is optimistic, while there are no statically significant diferrences between Neets and their peers.



## VI. On social exclusion: self- definition and a seemingly paradox

Q: Do you feel cut off/ isolated from the society?



A seemingly paradoxical finding is related to whether Neets, a typically socially vulnerable group, unemployed and cut off from institutions and the provisions of the Welfare State, feel socially excluded: and yet Neets do not feel socially excluded at a rate of 90,2%, almost equally to their peers (93,6%)

But is this finding interpretable? Undoubtedly Neets qualify for classification as socially excluded.

However as already stated they do not feel so themselves. The family security grid (74.8% find not only economic but also psychological support within their family), the widening of social vulnerability that inevitably brings many young people in a similar situation with Neets, reduce the feeling of alienation and isolation.


From the above it appears that the lack of the sense of exclusion felt by NEETs is due greatly to the sense of collectivity and solidarity they feel between them. In other words, that they are not on their own and there are others like them.



# VII. YOUTH SURVIVAL STRATEGIES

The abovementioned clearly affects young people's survival strategies. *The key choices, young people have already done or are highly likely to do, include seeking for a job, regardless its relation to their specialization and studies, migration abroad, changing residence (moving to another cheaper apartment or to family home) and even changing their dietary habits, by proceeding in severe cuts* (see Diagram 15).

*It should be mentioned at this point, that these top-5 choices are identical both to NEETs and their peers, namely the rest of the youth* (see KEPET & KEADIK 2016a: 28). *Indeed the impact of the crisis is multi-parametric, affecting substantial aspects and facets of young people's daily life.*



**A statistically significant correlation between the unemployment status and the key priorities set in terms of survival strategies**,  $\chi^2 (9, 2274) = 34.52, p < 0.001$ . The highest percentage of unemployed, at 29%, reported that they sought work outside their area of expertise due to the economic crisis, while the percentage of employed opting for this particular survival strategy was smaller, approximately at 21.1%.

**Table 5: Correlation between unemployment and survival strategies**

|   | Current Unemployment     |      |                          |      | Total      |      |
|---|--------------------------|------|--------------------------|------|------------|------|
|   | Yes<br>( <i>n</i> = 848) |      | No<br>( <i>n</i> = 1426) |      | (N = 2274) |      |
|   | <i>f</i>                 | %    | <i>f</i>                 | %    | <i>f</i>   | %    |
| Actions due to the economic crisis                    |                          |      |                          |      |            |      |
| Moved to a house with cheaper rent                    | 123                      | 14.5 | 260                      | 18.2 | 383        | 16.8 |
| Moved in with parents                                 | 112                      | 13.2 | 197                      | 13.8 | 309        | 13.6 |
| Reduced medical expenses                              | 35                       | 4.1  | 63                       | 4.4  | 98         | 4.3  |
| Sought financial help from friends                    | 24                       | 2.8  | 63                       | 4.4  | 87         | 3.8  |
| Participated in community and/or Church soup kitchens | 5                        | 0.6  | 3                        | 0.2  | 8          | 0.4  |
| Resorted to social groceries                          | 9                        | 1.1  | 22                       | 1.5  | 31         | 1.4  |
| Sold assets   | 11                       | 1.3  | 34                       | 2.4  | 45         | 2.0  |
| Changed eating habits (cheaper or less food)          | 71                       | 8.4  | 163                      | 11.4 | 234        | 10.3 |
| Sought a job outside my academic field/profession     | 246                      | 29.0 | 301                      | 21.1 | 547        | 24.1 |
| Immigrated to a foreign country                       | 212                      | 25.0 | 320                      | 22.4 | 532        | 23.4 |



- **Further, a statistically significant relationship between the educational level and the survival strategies was revealed**,  $\chi^2 (27, 2326) = 113.50, p < 0.001$ .
- Specifically, primary and secondary school graduates (ISCED 1-2) constituted the smallest percentage, stating that they sought work outside their field because of the economic crisis (12.4%), since they do not have (given their limited qualifications) any specific specialization.
- However, this particular survival strategy was reported to be chosen at higher percentages by subjects who are classified at the ISCED levels 3-4 (24.8%), ISCED levels 5-6 (29.9%), and ISCED level 7 (29.4%). Furthermore, the option of emigrating abroad was selected by respondents of the highest educational level (ISCED 7) at a percentage of 29.4%, while the other ISCED levels had lower percentages in opting for immigration, namely ISCED 1-2 (22.6%), ISCED 3-4 (23.8%), and ISCED 5-6 (22.4%).

**Table 6: Correlation between educational level and survival strategies**

|   | Educational level      |      |                         |      |                        |      |                     |      |                     |      |
|---|------------------------|------|-------------------------|------|------------------------|------|---------------------|------|---------------------|------|
|   | ISCED 1-2<br>(n = 403) |      | ISCED 3-4<br>(n = 1384) |      | ISCED 5-6<br>(n = 522) |      | ISCED 7<br>(n = 17) |      | Total<br>(N = 2326) |      |
|   | f                      | %    | f                       | %    | f                      | %    | f                   | %    | f                   | %    |
| Actions due to the economic crisis                    |                        |      |                         |      |                        |      |                     |      |                     |      |
| Moved to a house with cheaper rent                    | 49                     | 12.2 | 249                     | 18.0 | 93                     | 17.8 | 2                   | 11.8 | 393                 | 16.9 |
| Moved in with parents                                 | 62                     | 15.4 | 175                     | 12.6 | 77                     | 14.8 | 2                   | 11.8 | 316                 | 13.6 |
| Reduced medical expenses                              | 23                     | 5.7  | 60                      | 4.3  | 18                     | 3.4  | 0                   | 0.0  | 101                 | 4.3  |
| Sought financial help from friends                    | 29                     | 7.2  | 52                      | 3.8  | 10                     | 1.9  | 0                   | 0.0  | 91                  | 3.9  |
| Participated in community and/or Church soup kitchens | 0                      | 0.0  | 7                       | 0.5  | 1                      | 0.2  | 0                   | 0.0  | 8                   | 0.3  |
| Resorted to social groceries                          | 13                     | 3.2  | 13                      | 0.9  | 6                      | 1.1  | 0                   | 0.0  | 32                  | 1.4  |
| Sold assets   | 13                     | 3.2  | 28                      | 2.0  | 4                      | 0.8  | 1                   | 5.9  | 46                  | 2.0  |
| Changed eating habits (cheaper or less food)          | 73                     | 18.1 | 128                     | 9.2  | 40                     | 7.7  | 2                   | 11.8 | 243                 | 10.4 |
| Sought a job outside my academic field/profession     | 50                     | 12.4 | 343                     | 24.8 | 156                    | 29.9 | 5                   | 29.4 | 554                 | 23.8 |
| Immigrated to a foreign country                       | 91                     | 22.6 | 329                     | 23.8 | 117                    | 22.4 | 5                   | 29.4 | 542                 | 23.3 |

- **A statistically significant relationship was found between the average monthly family income and the survival strategies**,  $\chi^2 (36, 1941) = 55.81, p = 0.019$ .
- In particular, larger percentages of participants in the higher average monthly family income categories of €1001 - €1500, €1501 - €2000, and over €2000 chose to emigrate abroad as a result of the financial crisis at 22.9%, 26.7%, and 31.4%, respectively. This is in contrast to 19.1% in the average monthly family income of up to €500 and 17.1% in the €501 - €1000 categories. On the other hand, the participants from the three lower categories of average monthly family income, i.e., up to €500, €501 - €1000, and €1001 - €1500, at 16.1%, 14.6%, and 15.7%, respectively, decided to move back into the parental home as a result of the recession. This is in sharp contrast to the two higher family income categories of €1501 - €2000 and over €2000, where only 9.6% and 8.6% of respondents chose to do so.

**Table 7: Correlation between average monthly family income and survival strategies**


|   | Average family monthly income |      |               |      |                |      |                |      |                |      | Total<br>(N = 1941) |      |
|---|-------------------------------|------|---------------|------|----------------|------|----------------|------|----------------|------|---------------------|------|
|   | Up to 500<br>€                |      | 501-1000<br>€ |      | 1001-1500<br>€ |      | 1501-2000<br>€ |      | Over 2000<br>€ |      |                     |      |
|   | (n = 335)                     |      | (n = 636)     |      | (n = 503)      |      | (n = 292)      |      | (n = 175)      |      | f                   | %    |
|   | f                             | %    | f             | %    | f              | %    | f              | %    | f              | %    |                     |      |
| Actions due to the economic crisis                    |                               |      |               |      |                |      |                |      |                |      |                     |      |
| Moved to a house with cheaper rent                    | 60                            | 17.9 | 113           | 17.8 | 78             | 15.5 | 57             | 19.5 | 22             | 12.6 | 330                 | 17.0 |
| Moved in with parents                                 | 54                            | 16.1 | 93            | 14.6 | 79             | 15.7 | 28             | 9.6  | 15             | 8.6  | 269                 | 13.9 |
| Reduced medical expenses                              | 16                            | 4.8  | 33            | 5.2  | 21             | 4.2  | 10             | 3.4  | 4              | 2.3  | 84                  | 4.3  |
| Sought financial help from friends                    | 18                            | 5.4  | 24            | 3.8  | 17             | 3.4  | 11             | 3.8  | 8              | 4.6  | 78                  | 4.0  |
| Participated in community and/or Church soup kitchens | 0                             | 0.0  | 3             | 0.5  | 2              | 0.4  | 0              | 0.0  | 1              | 0.6  | 6                   | 0.3  |
| Resorted to social groceries                          | 7                             | 2.1  | 5             | 0.8  | 9              | 1.8  | 4              | 1.4  | 3              | 1.7  | 28                  | 1.4  |
| Sold assets   | 7                             | 2.1  | 10            | 1.6  | 14             | 2.8  | 5              | 1.7  | 7              | 4.0  | 43                  | 2.2  |
| Changed eating habits (cheaper or less food)          | 27                            | 8.1  | 79            | 12.4 | 45             | 8.9  | 29             | 9.9  | 18             | 10.3 | 198                 | 10.2 |
| Sought a job outside my academic field/profession     | 82                            | 24.5 | 167           | 26.3 | 123            | 24.5 | 70             | 24.0 | 42             | 24.0 | 484                 | 24.9 |
| Immigrated to a foreign country                       | 64                            | 19.1 | 109           | 17.1 | 115            | 22.9 | 78             | 26.7 | 55             | 31.4 | 421                 | 21.7 |

# VIII. Views and determinants of political behavior.


## The disengaged generation rising

### VIEW ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PERSONNEL


Young people, in total



NEETS



no NEETS







## IX. Entering the Blame Game

Who's to blame for his/her own condition, (according to the young people themselves)

NEETS



no NEETS



**54,4% of the young people blame primarily the political personnel for its gradually worsening situation**





# X. DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE ON THE GREEK STATE REGARDING WELFARE PROVISIONS

91,4 % of the Greek Youth do not trust at all or trusts a little the social welfare system in Greece. This lack of confidence is equally diffuse and in Neets and their peers.

This is indeed a clear indication of the collapse of the public trust among the young people in Greece.


Young people, in total



NEETS


# XI. INTENTION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEXT ELECTIONS

Young people, in total



The lack of confidence in the political system, results in a remarkable intention for abstention from the election procedure, regardless of when it would take place. **37,9% of the young voters state that they do not intend to participate in the next elections. The intentional turnout is limited to 59,9%.**


Neets



**Worth-mentioning:** the abstention rate increases as family income decreases and is correlated to the employment status.

## XII. INTENTION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEXT ELECTIONS

The rising of the disengaged self is clearly documented by this finding. 39,4% of the Greek young people feel isolated and alienated from any established ideology. In other words, in terms of ideology they belong nowhere.





# PART V

**The revival of the socio- economic & educational inequalities and the intergenerational transmission of poverty in Greek Youth. .**



## FINAL CONCLUSIONS I

- Given all the above-mentioned, it becomes evident that the ***employment status is substantially affected by the educational capital and the family background and in its turn (combined with the individual educational capital and the family income) affects the survival strategies and priorities and subsequently the key choices for the life- course of the young people in today's Greece.*** More specifically:
- Several of the findings document that the ***intergenerational transmission of poverty*** is one of the main consequences of the Recession in today's Greece and it clearly limits less privileged young people's employment prospects and life chances (see Table 2). ***More specifically, the social vulnerability among youth is correlated to the family economic background. In other words, the less privileged the family is, the more possible becomes for a young man/ woman to fall in a social vulnerable group, while the lower the monthly family income is, the greater the risk of social exclusion is*** (see Table 3).
- ***The educational capital seems to play a significant role in the employment status and even in the social vulnerability*** (see Table 1 & Table 4), ***while it affects young people's priorities and survival strategies*** (see Table 5). ***The low skilled and the medium skilled have clearly less employment opportunities*** (see Table 1). ***Despite their better employment prospects, the highly skilled young people prioritize migration as one of their key survival strategies (explaining the persisting brain drain in Greece), while the more highly skilled is somebody, the more are the chances to seek a job even outside his/ her field of specialization*** (see Table 6). ***These precise findings document the continuing disengagement of the Higher Education from the Labour Market. It became clear that the family income and the economic status of a young man/ woman defines its chances to migrate abroad*** (see Table 7), ***probably due to the support that the more privileged families can provide their children with in order to seek for a more suitable job, abroad.***
- Additionally, *family* seems to operate as an individualized policy substitute, given the deconstruction of the Welfare State, preventing the total disruption of the more social vulnerable groups' among youth (i.e. the NEETs') life course.

## FINAL CONCLUSIONS II

- Jennifer M. Silva, has documented her breakthrough concept of the “hardened self” in findings such as the following: *“for these young men and women, adulthood is not simply being delayed; Instead, adulthood is being dramatically re-imagined along lines of work, family, relationships, intimacy, gender, trust, and dignity.... (Meanwhile), experiences of betrayal within both the labor market and the institutions that frame their coming of age experiences teach young working-class men and women that they are completely alone, responsible for their own fates and dependent on outside help only at their peril.... (Silva 2013: 8, 9, 10 and 83).*
- Given the current state of play in Greek economy and society where the ongoing Recession prevails and its impact over-determines adulthood and young people’ life course, things seem even worse. ***Facing a discouraged and devastated reality, substantially reflecting on every key aspect of their life course, young people in Greece become increasingly frustrated, pessimistic and even angry. Their trust in social and political institutions is gradually collapsing, resulting in a crystal clear ideological alienation, that affects their political behavior*** (see analytically Papadakis et al 2017: 29-33).
- ***Lack of prospects, hopeless job- seeking in a disjointed labour- market, even less opportunities for the low and medium skilled ones, social exclusion directly correlated to the family background and the family economic resources, ineffective training and severe cuts in the welfare provisions define their present and undermine their future.***
- The long-lasting Crisis and the subsequent Recession limits young people’s future prospects and over-determines their choices, especially of the ones who are less privileged in terms of their educational capital and their family financial resources.
- ***The combination of social vulnerability and pessimism results in both an individualized multi-level withdrawal (see Papadakis, Kyridis, Papargyris 2015: 67) and a broader institutional disengagement, transformed into a vicious circle of degradation that threatens the social cohesion in Greece.***

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